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Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws*
Richard A. Posnerf
Much public and private enforcement of the antitrust laws is based
on a concern with exclusion, or in antitrust jargon "foreclosure," of
competing firms from the market. Such seemingly disparate practices as
tying arrangements, predatory pricing, vertical mergers, exclusive deal-
ing, and group boycotts are all challenged as tending to exclude com-
petitors on grounds unrelated to the superior efficiency of the firm or
firms doing the excluding.
The economists of the "Chicago School" of antitrust analysis, Aaron
Director and others,1 have mounted a powerful attack on the implicit
economic theory that underlies the current policy of the law towards
the allegedly exclusionary practices. One purpose of this article is to
restate these criticisms and in a few places extend them. The article will
also indicate some respects in which I consider the criticisms overstated.
Another purpose is to indicate the precise implications for antitrust
policy of an appropriately qualified critique of the economic premises
of current policy. These implications concern both the substantive con-
tent of the law and the allocation of responsibilities for law enforce-
ment.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
To organize the subsequent analysis, it is helpful to indicate the
three different kinds of practices with which antitrust law arguably
should be concerned.
The first category ("collusive practices") consists of practices by which
competing firms voluntarily eliminate competition among themselves
so as to become able to restrict output and raise prices. The major ex-
amples are cartelization and mergers to monopoly. The latter is nicely
illustrated by the formation of the United States Steel Corporation. 2
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U.S. Steel apparently had such a large fraction of the productive capacity
of the steel industry that it could obtain monopoly profits by limiting
its output. If the remaining firms in the industry had been able to ex-
pand their output rapidly without incurring higher production costs,
or if new firms could have entered the industry rapidly and operated
at a cost level no higher than that of the existing firms, U.S. Steel's
limitation of its output would not have resulted in any significant
reduction of the industry's output; the market price would therefore
have remained at the competitive level. Even if these conditions were
not fulfilled, as long as U.S. Steel took no steps to prevent its competi-
tors from gradually increasing their output or new firms from gradually
entering the industry, it could not expect its monopoly position to per-
sist indefinitely. The company did make some efforts to collude with
competitors, but it made no attempt to exclude them; as a result, its
market share declined steadily (from about 60 percent when the com-
pany was formed in 1901 to about 20 percent today). The history of
U.S. Steel indicates the policy and the eventual position of the monopo-
list firm that does not engage in exclusionary practices.
Next, there are the practices ("exclusionary practices") by which
firms attempt to exclude a rival, other than by having lower costs and
therefore lower prices. Predatory pricing, tying arrangements, vertical
integration, exclusive dealing, and group boycotts are the main exam-
ples of the practices that belong-or are thought to belong-in this
category.
Finally, there are practices by which firms that have a monopoly,
here defined simply as freedom from the competition of close substi-
tutes, seek to maximize their profits other than by colluding with or
excluding potential competitors. Price discrimination is the major, but
not the only, practice in this category. For want of a better term, we
may call the practices in this category "unilateral noncoercive monopo-
lizing."
Can a practice that cannot be put into any of these categories ration-
ally be considered a violation of the antitrust laws? If the purpose of
those laws is to promote competition in order to increase economic
efficiency, the answer is, I believe, "no." As to whether the antitrust
laws have other purposes, it is relevant to point out that no one has ever
articulated a coherent, objective, and operational noneconomic theory
of antitritst law. The following analysis assumes that the only purpose
of antitrust law is to promote efficiency.
nant Firm and the Inverted Umbrella, 8 J. LAw & EcoN. 167 (1965), reprinted in G. STICLER,
Tim ORGANiZATION OF INDUsTRY 108 (1968).
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The focus of this article is on the second category, exclusionary prac-
tices. However, because practices that should be considered unilateral
noncoercive monopolizing are frequently classified in the second cate-
gory, and because the policy of the law towards collusive practices is
sometimes inconsistent with its policy towards exclusionary practices,
the typology is worth introducing. In addition, it is an improvement
over the conventional division of antitrust practices into "horizontal"
and "vertical," which is not a useful division. Practices may be horizon-
tal, yet not offend any rational antitrust policy; the territorial restric-
tions challenged in United States v. Sealy, Inc.3 were, as the Supreme
Court found, horizontal rather than vertical, but neither their purpose
nor their likely effect was to curtail output and raise prices. Vertical
restraints may fall into either the second or the third category, and can
have very different properties. Some vertical restraints even fall into
the first category.4 And a horizontal practice, such as a boycott organized
by a group of competing firms, may operate like a conventional vertical
restraint, such as exclusive dealing, rather than like a cartel agreement.
II. TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND OTHER UNILATERAL NONCOERCVE
METHODS OF MAXIMIZING MONOPOLY PROFITS
One of the achievements of the Chicago School has been to show that
some practices thought to be exclusionary practices, notably tying,
really should be considered as monopoly profit maximization other than
by collusion or exclusion-unilateral noncoercive monopolizing. Peo-
ple used to regard tying as a method by which a firm having a monopoly
in one market (for example computers) could obtain a monopoly of a
second product (such as computer punch cards) by requiring all pur-
chasers of the first product also to buy the second from it. We rkow know
that this "leverage" theory is incorrect. If the price of the second product
is higher than the purchaser would have to pay on the open market,
he will treat the difference as an increase in the price of the first product
and his demand for the product will decline. In the absence of price
discrimination, it can be shown that the computer monopolist will gain
nothing from the second monopoly. Tying does, however, enable the
monopolist to practice price discrimination. By providing the computer
a 388 U.S. 350 (1967). A group of small mattress manufacturers adopted the Sealy trade-
mark. They agreed that on sales of mattresses under the Sealy name each member would
be limited to a designated territory. The reason for this "division of markets" was to
encourage each member to promote the trademark vigorously. Without the division, a
member might have exploited the goodwill created by another member's promotional
activities to undersell the latter. This arrangement would result in a general reluctance to
promote the mark.
4 Some resale price maintenance schemes are of this type.
[41:506
Exclusionary Practices
at cost and selling each card at a monopoly price, the computer monopo-
list can vary the charge for computing according to the amount, and
thus presumably the value, of each purchaser's use.5
This analysis of tying, although never refuted,6 has had no impact
on policy. There are, I conjecture, three reasons for this disregard.7
First, some commentators argued that to show the purpose of tying to
be discrimination rather than exclusion missed the point-the effect
was exclusionary and that was all that mattered.8 But there need not be
an exclusionary effect. The computer monopolist in our example has no
reason to displace the existing producers of punch cards and produce
cards himself, provided the existing producers are competitive with one
another and efficient; he only wants the sales of cards channeled through
him so that he can reprice them. There will be an exclusionary effect
if the purpose of the tie-in is to protect the manufacturer's goodwill
rather than to discriminate.9 Exclusion in that instance, however, re-
sults solely from the superior efficiency of the tied sale to a sale of the
products separately, and the tie-in should be permitted. The Supreme
Court brushed aside the goodwill argument, emphasizing that the manu-
facturer had an alternative that would have restricted competition less:
he could have issued specifications that any manufacturer of punch
cards would be required to meet. The central issue, however, is the
cost, rather than the existence, of an alternative. If the purpose of im-
posing the tie-in really was to protect goodwill rather than to discrimi-
nate, the specifications alternative was probably less efficient than the
tie-in; otherwise, the manufacturer would have promulgated specifica-
tions voluntarily.10 In these circumstances, to hold that the tie-in un-
5 Professor Ronald H. Coase questions this analysis. He doubts that differences in quan-
tity demanded accurately indicate differences in elasticity of demand and suggests that
tie-ins may have a different explanation, one connected with the difficulty of monopolizing
a durable good. See text at note 22 infra. True, a purchaser in large quantity has a greater
incentive to search for substitute products than the small-quantity purchaser; his demand
might therefore be more elastic than the small purchaser's. But the quantity of his pur-
chases could also mean that he had failed to find good substitutes, indicating that his
demand was less elastic. It is obviously difficult to decide a priori whether Professor Coase's
point is correct.
8 But see note 5 supra.
7 A fourth possible reason is that the theory was never subjected to an empirical test,
but competing theories have never been tested empirically either.
8 C. KAYSEN 9- D. TURNER, ANTITRUSt POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANAYSis 157
(1959); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv.
L. REv. 50, 63 n.42 (1958).
9 Indeed, this argument was made in the punch card case. International Business
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
10 It is possible, but unlikely, that the alternatives are equally effidnt. Another pos-
sibility is that the computer manufacturer makes, rather than buys, the cards in order to
have a colorable goodwill argument.
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lawfully restricts competition is tantamount to saying that any time a
monopoly producer decides to handle a step in the production process
internally, instead of inviting competitive bids, he is guilty of monopo-
lizing, because he is unnecessarily restricting competition.
OeouU, IL INIS MCe1 Urgue tlaE Lylng makes new comperition less
likely, because a firm wanting to enter the market for the tying product
must enter the market for the tied product as well-a new computer
manufacturer would have to produce his own cards.. This argument
is incorrect, however, if the existing computer manufacturer is buying
and repricing, rather than making, cards. If he is manufacturing cards,
then there is a presumption that the tie-in has an efficiency justification.
Moreover, in almost every tying case the tied product has been a trivial
adjunct to the tying product; a firm would have no difficulty in pro-
curing the requisite cards or ink 2 or salt 8 to supply together with his
computer, duplicating equipment, or salt machinery.
Third, to identify a practice as a form of price discrimination is not
to commend it in most people's eyes. I part company with some of my
colleagues at the University of Chicago by asserting that there is a sub-
stantial economic basis for the hostility to price discrimination. This
basis is best explained with the aid of the two simple diagrams in
Figure 1.
The left-hand diagram depicts a monopolist who is charging a single
price rather than discriminating. In conventional economic analysis the
economic cost of this monopoly would be limited to the triangle labeled
"deadweight loss." This area is the lost value to consumers that the
monopolist is unable to capture by his higher price. The larger area
labeled "monopoly profits" is not regarded as a cost since that loss to
consumers is exactly offset by the added revenues to the seller; there is
merely a transfer of wealth. But this way of analyzing the problem is
incomplete. It ignores the fact that firms will incur costs in competing
to become monopolists until the expected returns to monopoly are zero.
The expenditures on this competitive activity are social costs of monop-
oly in addition to the deadweight loss.' 4
11 See, e.g., C. KAYSEN : D. TURNER, supra note 8.
12 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
13 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
14 I am not, of course, speaking of expenditures simply on increasing output. Such ex-
penditures would result in a reduction in the monopoly price, eventually to the competi-
tive level, and in the consequent elimination of monopoly profits. I am speaking rather of
expenditures on securing a monopoly position, for example, expenditures incidental to the
formation of a cartel. Sometimes expenditures for the purpose of securing a monopoly have
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FIGTJE 1
An analogy can be drawn to theft. 5 At a superficial level of analysis,
a theft unaccompanied by injury or other damage represents a pure
transfer payment and is therefore not a source of social cost. Theft does
impose social costs, however, in thieves' time and tools, in victim self-pro-
tection, and the like. The higher the returns to theft, the greater will
be the resources invested in thieving (and protecting against theft), until
cost and gain at the margin are equated. So it is, presumably, with
monopoly. The profits generated by monopoly pricing will encourage
firms to expend resources on becoming monopolists. The expenditure
of resources will continue to the point at which the expected value of
monopolizing, less the costs of obtaining a monopoly, is equal to the
next most profitable use of these resources.' 6 Therefore, as a first ap-
proximation, the cost of monopoly in the left-hand diagram of Figure 1
is equal to the entire hatched area.'7
a socially valuable by-product; a good example is innovation that results in the issuance
of a valid patent. I discuss expenditures of that sort separately below.
15 See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 78 J. POL. EcoN. 169
(1968); Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Thefts, 5 W. EcoN. J. 224
(1967).
16 The effect of monopoly in deflecting revenues from other activities into monopolizing
has long been recognized in the analysis of patents. See G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSrRY 124 (1968); Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Invention, 1
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 30 (1934).
17 With diminishing returns to obtaining a monopoly, the total cost of monopoly will
be lower than the total revenue since marginal cost will be higher than average cost, as
shown in Figure 2:
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The right-hand diagram depicts a monopolist who, facing the same
cost and demand conditions as the monopolist in the left-hand diagram,
perfectly and costlessly discriminates in price. Every sale is made at a
price equal to the value that the consumer places on the purchase, and
no cost is incurred in ascertaining those values and dealing separately
with each consumer over each unit of output. The effect of such dis-
crimination is to increase the profits of the monopolist to an amount
measured by the entire area between the demand curve and the mar-
MC
q Quantity
FIGURa 2
AR is the average revenue fr6m monopolizing, and MC the marginal cost of becoming a
monopolist. The difference between the total revenues from monopolizing (pq) and the
total marginal costs of monopolizing (the area under MC between the origin and q) is
economic rent earned by resources specialized to monopolizing. This rent is not a social
cost.
Ignoring this point (i.e., assuming constant returns to scale in monopolizing), we can
easily express-the relationship between the traditional deadweight loss of monopoly (D)
and the additional loss (L) generated when firms expend resources on becoming monop-
olists. D in Figure 3 is simply V2(P, -P)(Q -Q!), while L is (P' - P)Q'. The ratio of L to D
$
L
P, D
PM MC
I \i dY
L QuantityQ, Q
FIGURE 3
is, therefore, simply 2Q'/Q - Q!. Thus, where the percentage reduction in output brought
about by monopolizing is small, the deadweight loss of monopoly is only a small fraction
of the additional loss. For example, if Q = 100 and Q' = 95 (meaning that monopoliza-
tion has resulted in a 5 percent reduction in output), L is 38 times as large as D. For a
full development of this analysis and some empirical results see R. Posner, The Social Costs
of Monopoly and Regulation, May 1974 (unpublished paper).
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ginal cost curve, hatched in the diagram, and to eliminate the dead-
weight loss. The hatched area in the right-hand diagram is larger than
the hatched area in the left-hand diagram, implying that the social cost
of monopoly is higher under perfect price discrimination than under
single-price monopoly, even though the conventional deadweight loss
is zero. In addition, under discrimination, purchasers pay different
prices for the same product that are unrelated to cost differences, thus
distorting competition among them.
The conclusion that price discrimination increases the social costs
of monopoly holds even if we relax the unrealistic assumptions that
discrimination is perfect and costless. If discrimination is not perfect,
and it never is, the effect on the monopolist's output and hence on the
deadweight loss of monopoly becomes an empirical question that will
be answered differently from case to case: the output may be larger
than, smaller than, or the same as the output under a single monopoly
price.18 If the only difference between perfect and imperfect price dis-
crimination were that the latter involved deadweight loss, our earlier
conclusion would be unambiguously strengthened. An additional dif-
ference, however, is that imperfect discrimination is less profitable.
Thus, the deadweight loss is less under perfect than under imperfect
price discrimination, but the monopoly profits, and hence the costs that
will be incurred to obtain the monopoly, are greater under perfect
discrimination.
The fact that discrimination is costly to implement increases the
social costs of a discriminating monopoly relative to those of a single-
price monopoly. The costs of implementing discrimination represent a•
net social loss, because these costs do not, on the average, produce social
benefits. One can imagine cases in which the sum of (1) the additional
costs of monopolizing due to the higher profits from discrimination and
(2) the costs of discriminating could be less than the benefits, represented
by a reduction in deadweight loss, that the discrimination might pro-
duce; but there is no reason to think that such cases are common.
The major qualification to the foregoing analysis is that if society
wants to increase the amount of monopoly-for example, in order to
spur invention-the effect of higher monopoly profits in inducing more
monopolizing may count as a social gain instead of a social loss. This
observation is relevant to the many cases in which tie-ins have been im-
posed by firms owning patents in order to increase their profits from
the patented invention. If one thought that the patent laws tended to
undercompensate inventors, resulting in a suboptimal rate of innova-
18 See J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMiwrFCr COMP='nON 188-95 (1933).
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don, one might want to encourage price discrimination in order to in-
crease the amount of investment in inventive activity. Unfortunately,
no one has any idea whether the nondiscriminatory exploitation of
patents would result in too much, too little, or the right amount of in-
vention.19
The main point of this discussion is that reclassifying tie-ins from an
exclusionary practice to a form of price discrimination, or unilateral
noncoercive monopolizing, does not establish that they ought to be per-
mitted by the antitrust laws. There is, however, a serious objection to
prohibiting tie-ins. Given the absence of any general and uniform pro-
hibition against discrimination, the prohibition of tie-ins is trivial; the
monopolist will merely adopt another, and lawful, method of discrimi-
nating.20 This raises the question, which I cannot hope to resolve here,
whether there should be a general prohibition of price discrimination.21
The common argument that such a prohibition would merely treat a
symptom of monopoly, rather than monopoly itself, is unpersuasive.
If the previous analysis is correct, and discrimination is a source of net
social costs, an effective and inexpensive prohibition would increase
economic welfare. A more serious objection to prohibiting price dis-
crimination is that it is often a by-product of movement from one equi-
librium to another-sbmetimes from a monopolistic to a competitive
equilibrium-and prohibiting it would impede such movements. More-
over, discrimination is difficult (costly) to prove; the Robinson-Patman
19 See W. BOWMAN, JR., supra note 1, at 15-31.
20 Of course, if all of the other methods are much costlier or much less effective, the
amount of discrimination may be significantly reduced, which by the previous analysis
would generate social cost savings. This assumption, however, seems implausible, since
use can be metered directly as well as by a tie-in.
21 That the law contains such a prohibition is suggested in Commissioner Ehnan's con-
curring opinion in Peelers Co., 65 F.T.C. 799, 865-69 (1964), discussed approvingly by the
court of appeals that reviewed the Commission's decision. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117
(5th Cir. 1966). The patentee of the only process for cleaning shrimp by machine leased
the machine at a higher price to Pacific Northwest shrimpers than to Gulf Coast shrimpers
because the costs of cleaning by hand were higher for the former group. The result was
to perpetuate a cost difference between competing segments of the industry that the de-
velopment of machine cleaning, in the absence of discrimination, would have eliminated.
Commissioner Elman cited as precedent for his view that a monopolist has a duty to
refrain from discrimination United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912),
but that case is distinguishable because the targets of the discrimination there were
competitors of the discriminating firms rather than customers. Although discrimination
against a competitor was alleged in the Peelers case, and found by the Commission, Com-
missioner Elman rejected this finding in his opinion.
A narrow interpretation of the result in Peelers is that it was a case in which section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), was used to plug a loophole
in the Robinson-Patman Act; the discrimination there was effected through ajlease rather
than a sale.
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Act is a testament to the problems of attempting to regulate discrimina-
tion.
I do not want to leave the impression that discrimination is the only
form of unilateral noncoercive monopolizing. For example, Professor
Coase has argued that the lease-only policy of a monopolist of a durable
good, such as United Shoe Machinery Corporation, may be designed to
overcome the difficulties encountered in trying to charge a monopoly
price for a durable good.22 Perhaps the lease-only policy should have
been forbidden on that ground, but this paper will argue that, as with
tie-ins, the lease-only policy is not exclusionary.
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES
A. Predatory Pricing
Within the class of allegedly exclusionary practices, it is useful to
distinguish practices that require the cooperation of a customer to be
effective from those that do not. Predatory pricing depends on the pur-
chasers' willingness to buy from the predator (or the intended victim)
at the predatory price; blowing up a competitor's plant or procuring a
patent from the Patent Office by fraud does not. This distinction is im-
portant to our analysis, although less important regarding predatory
pricing than some of the other exclusionary practices.
Suppose that the Standard Oil trust reduces its price in one market
below cost, hoping to drive out its competitors there and later raise its
price to a monopoly level. Presumably it expects its eventual monopoly
profits, discounted to present value, to exceed the losses from selling
below cost now. This assessment must assume, however, that the aver-
age purchaser in this market will sustain a net loss by paying a sub-
competitive price to Standard, instead of a higher price to a competitor
of Standard. 23 The lower price he pays now will be more than offset by
the higher price he will pay later when Standard, with his help, obtains
a monopoly. The purchaser would be better off continuing to patronize
Standard's nominally higher-priced competitor.
This point seems to have been overlooked in discussions of predatory
pricing; but, while relevant, the point is not decisive on the question of
whether predatory pricing is a rational business strategy absent legal
sanctions. The argument assumes that the purchaser (1) is sufficiently
informed and far-sighted to realize the cost to him of taking advantage
of the temporarily lower price and (2) will not act as a "free rider,"
22 Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J. LAw & ECON. 143 (1972).
23 It is irrelevant how long the purchaser, if it is a firm, expects to remain in the
market; the higher price in the future will adversely affect the firm's market value.
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taking advantage of the lower price in the hope that the refusal of other
purchasers to do so will cause the predator's campaign to fail. These
assumptions are unrealistic in some market settings, particularly when
there are many purchasers.
An extensive literature24 seeks to show on other grounds that
predatory pricing is -not an effective method of monopolizing. That
literature, however, has been excessively influenced by John McGee's
pathbreaking article on the use, or rather the nonuse, of predatory
pricing by the Standard Oil trust.25 Ever since that article appeared,
scholars have stated the question of predatory pricing as whether it was
rational for the Standard Oil trust to practice such pricing. The answer
has been negative, because it is cheaper to acquire than to undersell a
competitor. But this answer is convincing only if mergers are assumed
to be legal, and although this assumption was reasonable throughout
most of the history of the Standard Oil trust, the illegality of mergers
to create a monopoly has now long been settled. Predatory pricing is also
illegal, but it is more difficult to detect than mergers. Thus, given the
legal environment, predation may in fact be a cheaper method of
monopolization than acquisition.26
This possibility does not, of course, make predation an effective
method of monopolization. To impose costs on a competitor by im-
posing the same or greater costs on oneself does not look like a very
promising method- of excluding a competitor. If, however, a firm
operates in a number of markets and faces actual or potential competi-
tors that are each limited to one of its markets, it may be worthwhile
for it to expend large resources on crushing a single competitor so as to
develop a reputation for willingness to use predatory pricing. Such a
reputation would enable the firm to exclude other potential competi-
tors without additional below-cost selling; stated otherwise, the costs
incurred by the firm in using predatory pricing in one market might
generate offsetting benefits in other markets. Knowing that the domi-
nant firm might act in this way, a competitor might be reluctant to enter
24 Most of the literature is cited in Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Com.
ments, 15 J. LAiw & ECON. 129 (1972).
25 McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, 1 J. LAw & ECON.
137 (1958).
26 Moreover, even if predation were always cheaper than acquisition, it would not
follow that it was nonexistent. Settlement is cheaper than litigation as a method of resolv-
ing legal disputes, yet one observes litigation occurring. The basic reason is that the
parties to a dispute may have divergent expectations regarding the likely outcome of
litigation, which may make it impossible for them to agree on a mutually advantageous
settlement price. Similarly, competing firms might not be able to agree on a mutually
advantageous price for the sale of one firm's assets to the other. In such circumstances,
predation might be the only method of achieving a monopoly.
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any market in which the firm operated, and if he was already in such a
market he might refrain from price competition or agree to sell out
to the dominant firm at a low price. On this analysis, the threat of preda-
tory pricing might have been effectively used by the Standard Oil trust,
because it operated in more markets than many of its actual and poten-
tial competitors.27 If the threat was effective, actual predatory pricing
may have been unnecessary; moreover, an implicit threat may have
been sufficient. In either case, McGee's study of the record in the
Standard Oil case might not have uncovered the extent to which Stan-
dard owed its market position to predatory tactics.28
Thus, to conclude that predatory pricing is never an effective ex-
clusionary practice is unsupportable-whether or not the predator is
assumed to have superior access to capital. However, our analysis implies
that predatory pricing at most is likely to delay, rather than prevent,
the entry of new competitors. It is unlikely that a firm planning to enter
all of the markets of the dominant firm would be deterred by fear of
predatory pricing. In those circumstances the benefits of predatory
pricing are unlikely to exceed the costs, since the costs must be incurred
in every market in which the predator operates; hence, the dominant
firm will find it difficult to make a credible threat to engage in preda-
tory pricing. Probably the only long-run consequence of predatory
pricing, therefore, is to increase the scale of new entry. This result may
lengthen the time that it takes for entry to occur-as will be seen, more
time may be required to organize a large operation than a small one-
but it should not entirely preclude entry. The need to enter on a larger
scale does not increase the costs of the new entrant relative to those
of the existing firm, since the latter also operates on the larger scale.
Any diseconomies caused by operating in so many markets are also
experienced by the existing firm.
Any factor that delays entry prolongs the period of monopoly pricing
and thereby increases the social costs of monopoly. The increase in these
costs, however, may not be large. A commonly overlooked point is that
an increase in the time required for new entry may actually make entry
more attractive to some firms; they may anticipate a longer period
before any supracompetitive profits that they are able to obtain in the
market disappear due to competition from additional entrants.
What are the implications for legal policy of a correct economic
analysis of predation? This paper has argued that the case for relegating
27 Cf. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LxGAL S-umrns 399, 432-33 (1973).
28 In addition, the fact that a practice is not uncovered by the lawyers for a party to a
lawsuit is not very compelling evidence that the practice did not exist.
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predatory pricing to the realm of the irrational has not been made.
Even if it had been made, as many economists believe, it would not
follow that the prohibition against predatory pricing should be re-
moved. To be sure, the costs of the prohibition may be high because
predatory pricing is not easy to distinguish from other forms of price
competition. At the same time, however, the prohibition has some posi-
tive benefits even under the assumption that predation is never rational
profit-maximizing behavior. The correct level of an activity is achieved
by compelling actors to bear the full social costs of their actions, in-
cluding mistakes; the predator's losses may not equal those costs. This
possibility is clearly raised when predation succeeds to the extent that
the period of below-cost pricing is followed by one of supracompetitive
pricing. The social costs incurred in each period are additive. The mis-
allocative effects of selling a product below cost, thus inducing ineffi-
dent substitution towards it, are not reduced by subsequently selling
the product at a monopoly price, thus inducing inefficient substitution
away from it. The private costs of predatory pricing are thus lower than
the social costs, because the period of monopoly pricing compensates the
seller, though by hypothesis not fully, for the losses he incurred when he
sold the product below cost.
That forbidding predatory pricing would be a source of some social
benefits-either because predation is sometimes a rational practice or
because, though irrational, it would be practiced occasioially by firms
that misconceived their self-interest-does not mean that such a prohi-
bition is wise. That depends on the costs of the prohibition in relation
to its benefits. Those costs are substantial because of the difficulty of
distinguishing between predatory and efficient pricing.
There are two conventional approaches to the identification of pred-
atory pricing, one through intent and the other through cost. Neither
is adequate. If the forbidden activity is defined as pricing intended to
weaken or destroy a competitor, too much is forbidden. A seller may
want to destroy a competitor, but if the only method used is under-
selling because of lower costs there is no rational antitrust objection.
And too little is also prevented. Intent may be impossible to prove;
further, inadvertently pricing below cost could be just as injurious and
inefficient as pricing below cost with intent to exclude competitors.
Alternatively, if predatory pricing is defined as pricing below cost or as
discriminatory pricing, we may forbid too much, depending on how
we define cost or discrimination; or, as we shall see, we may forbid too
little.
It would seem that only two practices should be forbidden as preda-
tory or (a better term perhaps) exclusionary pricing. The first is selling
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below short-run marginal cost. There is no reason consistent with an
interest in efficiency for selling a unit at a price lower than the cost that
the seller incurs by the sale. We expect the clothing store to sell last
year's fashions at a drastic discount-its price may even be lower than
what it paid for the goods-but not at a price lower than the cost of
making the sale, which includes any profit it might have expected from
charging a higher price. A sale below cost in this sense can only have
the purpose and effect of excluding an equally or more efficient rival.
Unfortunately, measurement problems make this category of forbidden
practice difficult to use; for example, how does this legal rule treat the
case in which a firm offers goods below cost a a method of sales promo-
tion? The true sales price can be calculated only by including any
future revenues generated by the sale-other than revenue produced
by monopoly pricing.29 The difficulties of measurement seem forbid-
ding, given the present state of economic science.
The second practice that should be forbidden is selling below long-
run marginal cost with the intent to exclude a competitor. Long-run
marginal costs are those that must be recovered to stay in business for
the more or less indefinite future. In a retail store they include the
rent, insurance, other overhead costs, and the cost of inventory. If the
retailer's total revenue is not large enough to cover all of these costs, he
will eventually be forced out of business. Selling below long-run mar-
ginal cost, however, is not conclusive evidence of socially inefficient pric-
ing. Some businesses, or parts of businesses, have no future. No social
purpose is served by forcing a seller to include in his price a charge for
the depreciation of a plant that will never be replaced. In these circum-
stances, charging a price below long-run marginal cost does not imply
an exclusionary intent or effect. On the contrary, the purpose and effect
are to make a graceful-cost-minimizing--exit, leaving the field to more
efficient firms.
If there is intent to exclude, however, pricing below long-run mar-
ginal cost will have the purpose and likely effect of excluding an equally
efficient competitor-equally efficient because if the "predator" is more
efficient he can and will exclude his competitor by charging a price
equal to or higher than his own long-run marginal costs. Again, mea-
surement problems abound; in particular, the assignment of marginal
costs to an individual product or market will often be quite arbitrary.
29 Even the qualification must be qualified. A firm might dispose of some of its output
below cost in one market in order to limit its output, and thereby increase its prices and
profits, in another market, where it had a monopoly. Such "dumping" may be objection-
able, but not on the ground of tending to exclude competitors in the market where the
dumping occurred.
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Moreover, the need to rely on evidence of intent is a disturbing feature
of this approach, especially to economists, whose assumption is that peo-
ple's actions yield better insight into their true purposes than what
they say. An alternative approach, which seems, however, to be beyond
the present capacity of economic science, is to examine the full range
of possible reasons for a particular pricing policy and to infer predation
only after rejecting all other possible reasons for selling below marginal
cost (declining demand, obsolete plant, and the like) as implausible in
the circumstances of the case.
A short cut to finding predation that seems even less appropriate than
requiring proof of sales below marginal cost plus exclusionary intent is
requiring proof of price discrimination plus exclusionary intent. If the
alleged predator's price is above his long-run marginal costs in the
relevant market, it is irrelevant that he is charging a higher price else-
where, where he faces less competition; his lower price in the relevant
market can exclude only a less efficient competitor-one whose long-
run marginal costs are higher than the defendant's. By linking exclu-
sionary intent and area price discrimination, while ignoring the rela-
tionship between price and long-run marginal cost in the relevant
,markets, the Supreme Court reached an anticompetitive result in Utah
Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.30 The defendants were charging
lower prices in markets in which the plaintiff competed than they were
charging in some other markets. The Court cited no evidence of sales
at a price below long-run marginal cost.31 Intent to weaken Utah Pie
was shown, but that evidence was neither surprising nor disreputable
considering that Utah Pie, rather than any of the defendants, was the
dominant firm in the markets involved.
Another indefensible predatory pricing case is Telex Corp. v. IBM
Corp.,3 2 in which a district court found that IBM had made drastic
price reductions in equipment that was "plug-compatible" with its
main-frame computer equipment in order to repel the competitive
inroads made by Telex, another producer, of equipment plug-compati-
ble with IBM computers. The court held the price reductions unlawful,
emphasizing that (1) IBM was the dominant firm in the relevant market
(oddly and inaccurately defined as the sale of equipment plug-compati-
ble with IBM computers); (2) the price reductions reduced IBM's net
revenue from sales of the products in question; (3) the reductions were
not cost justified; and (4) IBM's purpose was to weaken Telex.
30 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
31 The Court did state that one of the defendants was not recouping its "full over-
head," id. at 698-99, but it did not suggest that the amount of overhead foregone was a
long-run marginal cost of selling in Utah Pie's markets.
32 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
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This evidence, however, is consistent with the hypothesis-neither
mentioned by the court nor, apparently, argued by either party, but one
that fairly leaps to the eye-that IBM was adjusting in a natural and
socially appropriate manner to the erosion of its monopoly position
because of Telex's entry into the market. IBM began with 100 percent
of the relevant market; even though the court incorrectly defined the
market, we may assume that IBM had some monopoly power and that
its price exceeded its cost. Telex's advent provided competitive alter-
natives to IBM's customers. As a result the demand curve facing IBM
became more elastic, the profit-maximizing monopoly price fell, and
IBM lowered its price. The price reduction was not cost justified; it
was a reaction to a change in demand, rather than a change in cost, and
the final price may still have exceeded IBM's long-run marginal cost.
IBM's net revenues in the relevant market fell, because Telex's entry
was an adverse development to which IBM reacted by attempting to
limit its losses. These losses would have been greater if IBM had per-
mitted Telex to take the entire market, but IBM could not hope to
increase its revenues above what they would have been if Telex had
not entered the market. A monopolist's profits must fall if the demand
for his product becomes more elastic as the result of, for example, new
entry.
The effect of the court's approach in Telex is to force a dominant
firm to operate at a price higher than the monopoly price; the firm is
prohibited from closing the umbrella of high, monopoly prices that en-
couraged firms like Telex to enter its markets. This result is perverse
and would have been avoided if the court had used the two-part test
of predatory pricing suggested above. There are grave doubts, however,
about the feasibility of that test. One is left wondering whether any
rule against predatory pricing can be justified in light of the costs of
administering such a rule.
Nevertheless, if some rule against predatory pricing is to be retained,
the question arises: who should enforce the rule? Should it be the gov-
ernment, the predator's competitors, or both in some combination?
Private enforcement is a realistic possibility in this area, because the
principal victims of predation are firms having a sufficiently large stake
to be motivated to sue.
If the only concern were maximizing the utility of a fixed budget for
public antitrust enforcement, then enforcement of the antitrust laws
clearly should be left to private plaintiffs in areas in which they have
strong incentives to sue, such as predatory pricing. But such a concern
is too narrow. It is also necessary to consider the costs of private anti-
trust enforcement; the major cost is the distortion of doctrine.
1974]
The University of Chicago Law Review
It may be a coincidence that both Utah Pie and Telex were private
cases. No one has done a systematic study of the contribution of the
private action to antitrust doctrine; indeed, it- may be too soon to do
so, since the rise of the private action to a position of importance in
the enforcement of the antitrust laws is very recent. For what it is worth,
my impression-shared by many other students of antitrust law-is
that private antitrust cases tend to deviate from fundamental antitrust
policy more than Department of Justice antitrust cases. Why might
this be so?
The rules of antitrust law are produced mainly by Congress and the
Supreme Court,3 and the costs to each institution of producing these
rules are very high.84 Legislative enactment is a costly method of pro-
duction, because it entails negotiation among many parties (the legis-
lators) and because the productive capacity of a legislature is inherently
limited since expansion of its membership increases the costs of each
enactment. Therefore, assuming that detailed and specific legislation
is more costly to produce than general and vague legislation, one can
expect legislated antitrust rules to be vague and general. Rule produc-
tion by the Supreme Court does not involve the costs of large-number
negotiations, because there are only nine Justices. But the Court has a
heavy, extremely diverse workload that limits the time it can effectively
allocate to learning the facts of a particular case and drafting a careful
opinion in an area so complex and technical as antitrust law.
As a result of these factors, the body of antitrust rules does not im-
plement with precision the basic purposes of the antitrust laws; what
is forbidden does not exactly fit what was intended to be forbidden.
The relevant part of the misfit here is the rules' overinclusiveness: they
forbid, or can be read as forbidding, conduct that is not actually anti-
competitive. The rules could be too narrow as well as too broad, but it
is not important, for the present argument, to show that the antitrust
rules are systematically overinclusive.35 The only fact essential to the
argument is that the rules contain some overbroad or overinclusive ele-
ments.
One effect, and perhaps a purpose, of a public monopoly of law en-
forcement is to limit the effect of overbroad rules. The Supreme Court
can state-as it virtually has-that all horizontal mergers violate sec-
3 The Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970), which authorizes direct appeal from the
federal district courts to the Supreme Court in antitrust cases brought by the Justice
Department, has reduced the role of the courts of appeals.
84 The theoretical basis for the following discussion is presented in Ehrlich & Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL Sroums 257 (1974).
35 It seems, however, that the rules are indeed systematically overinclusive for reasons
that are not well understood.
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tion 7 of the Clayton Act.3 6 If enforced, such a rule would impose heavy
social costs; and the rule might be enforced if private enforcement is
permitted. The Supreme Court (or Congress) then might have to incur
heavy costs 7 in retracting its statement and formulating a more careful
rule of law. The alternative is a public monopoly of enforcement. The
Justice Department will not enforce a rule banning all horizontal
mergers, because it lacks the resources to bring every case that falls
within the careless language of Supreme Court opinions.38 With a
public monopoly of enforcement, legislative enactment becomes a two-
stage process. The legislature first enacts the statutory standard and
later appropriates funds to the enforcement agency. The appropriation
determines the scope of enforcement-the operational meaning of the
statute-since the smaller the appropriation, the more selective the
agency must be. The agency might select the silliest cases first, but
there is no basis in theory or experience that indicates it would.39
This analysis is suggestive, but not completely convincing.40 Its im-
plications reach far beyond the question whether private parties should
be permitted to bring predatory-pricing cases. The analysis thus far,
however, is incomplete; in comparing private and public enforcement
of antitrust law we have not exhausted the possible alternative methods
of dealing with exclusionary practices. The analysis will be expanded
after discussing the remaining exclusionary practices.
B. Vertical Mergers
If a firm purchases a customer or a supplier and directs the acquired
company to deal only with the firm, the market for its competitors'
goods, or its competitors' access to inputs, will be reduced. The same
effect can be achieved by opening a new outlet and channeling all sales
through the outlet,41 but there are few cases in which vertical integra-
tion through internal expansion, instead of acquisition, has been chal-
36 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
But cf. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1186 (1974).
37 On the difficulty of reducing the Court's workload to free the Justices' time for more
careful deision-making, see Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload,
3 J. LEGAL STUDIEs (1974) (forthcoming).
38 Compare Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, pt. I, 1 TRADE REG. REP., pt. I,
4510, at 6883-85 (1968), with United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
39 Cf. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL SruDms 305 (1972),
reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 216 (G. Becker & W. Landes eds.
1974).
40 Among other things, it does not explain why the Federal Trade Commission's anti-
trust decisions have generally been more anticompetitive than those of the Justice Depart-
ment.
41 See Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY TOwARD MERG-
ERs 167, 175-76 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969).
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lenged under the antitrust laws. The exclusionary effect of a vertical
merger is similar to that of a contract between a firm and a customer
or supplier whereby the latter agrees to deal exclusively in the firm's
goods, but there are enough differences between the contract and
merger methods of exclusive dealing to warrant separate treatment.
Imagine an industry with two levels, production and distribution.
If production is monopolized and distribution is competitive, can
the monopolist increase his profits by buying out the distributors?
The analysis is parallel to that of tying. If the producer acquires the
distributors and increases the retail markup, he will have to decrease
his producer's markup by the same amount. He cannot maximize his
profits by charging a price above the monopoly price determined with
reference to all relevant costs, including the cost of distribution. It is
also necessary, however, to consider the possibility that the acquisition
of the distributors will delay new entry at the production level by
making it necessary for a new entrant to enter at both the distribution
and production levels. 42 We brushed aside a similar argument with
respect to tying arrangements by observing that the tied product is
usually a trivial adjunct to the tying product 43 but the argument has
greater appeal in the present context.
A firm's cost of production is inversely related to the time interval
between the decision to produce and the delivery to the purchaser of
the output.44 Since increases in the interval reduce the present value
of the firm's output, as well as the cost, the firm will not delay produc-
tion and delivery indefinitely. The optimum delay will depend in
part on the rate at which cost falls with delay, and one imagines that
the rate will be higher for more complicated production processes. This
relationship may explain why U.S. Steel's monopoly position was not
eliminated immediately after creation by the entry of new firms or the
expansion of existing firms: the cost of quickly creating, or rapidly
expanding, a complex enterprise such as steel production is prohibi-
tively high.45 Consider the contrasting position of a firm that buys up
42 Delay, rather than prevent, because the new entrants costs would be no higher than
the existing firm's; each would have costs of distribution and production. See text following
note 28 supra.
43 See text at notes 11-13 supra.
44 Alchian, Costs and Outputs, in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 159, 165 (W. Breit :
H. Hochman eds., 2d ed. 1971).
45 This answer is not completely satisfactory, since it does not explain why the formation
of U.S. Steel was not anticipated far enough in advance to enable competing firms or new
entrants to complete their preparations for expansion by the time U.S. Steel was formed;
perhaps its formation was too uncertain to induce the investment necessary to enlarge
the capacity of firms not included in the merger.
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all of the grocery stores in a town and begins to charge monopoly prices.
Even if the monopoly is completely unanticipated, the creation of
additional grocery stores will take only a short time, because the activi-
ties that must be coordinated in order to open a new grocery store-
obtaining suitable premises, hiring the necessary personnel, financing,
and arrangements with suppliers and customers-are few and simple.
The discussion thus far has assumed that, if the existing producer
owns all of the distribution outlets, a new entrant into production
would have to open distribution outlets. This assumption, however, is
not necessarily true; if entry into production is anticipated, new firms
will enter at the distribution level in order to provide a market for the
new producers. But this anticipation merely converts explicit coordina-
tion into implicit coordination. A new firm will not enter at the pro-
duction level until it is reasonably confident that it will have distribu-
tion outlets, and new firms will not enter into distribution until they
are reasonably confident that there will be producers to supply them.
The parallel entry of the new producer and the new distributors could
take longer than entry at one level.
In sum, the monopoly producer's acquisition of the existing distribu-
tion outlets could delay new entry into production, and this delay
would tend to increase the monopoly price. It is also possible that
having to enter at the distribution level might increase the costs of the
new producer relative to those of the existing firm by increasing the
risk premium charged by the suppliers of capital to the new entrant.46
This factor is independent of the new entrant's choice between creating
his own distribution outlets and awaiting the entry of new distributors,
since any risk premium charged the latter is an indirect cost of pro-
duction.
Although the monopoly producer derives benefits from acquiring
all of his distributors, he also incurs costs. 47 The acquisition will only
delay entry, rather than preclude it, and when entry does occur the
producer who owns all of the existing distribution outlets and refuses
to carry his competitors' goods will find himself with excess distributive
capacity, because he will lose some business to the new entrant. This
loss will increase his average costs and decrease his profits compared to
what they would have been with a smaller investment in distribution.
If the market is growing, the monopolist can avoid this result by adding
new distribution outlets more slowly than necessary to provide distri-
48 Williamson, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 647, 658 (1974) (review of W. BowmatN, supra
note 1). A similar argument is made in Peltzman, supra note 41, at 173.
47 This point is stressed in Peltzman, supra note 41, at 169-70.
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bution for the entire market, but this course of action would mean that
there will be distributors for the new entrant's goods when he appears.
To try to delay the entry of new competitors by precluding the de-
velopment of an independent distribution system involves two addi-
tional types of cost. First, the firm is likely to encounter diseconomies in
integrating distribution and production. Integration for the purpose
of exclusion implies that there are no economies of integration; if
there were, there would be an independent and socially acceptable
ground for integration. Second, if the firm has a policy of monopolizing
distribution, people may start distribution outlets for the sole purpose
of being bought out by the firm-a form of lawful extortion. To com-
bat such extortion the acquiring firm may have to resort to predatory
pricing, also a costly measure.
Imagine now that there are two producers, each with 50 percent of
the market, and one decides to eliminate the other by buying all of the
distribution outlets and then terminating their purchase of competing
products. The other producer will respond by opening his own outlets,
or independent firms will open them. In the end, the first producer will
own twice as many outlets as he needs for his output, and his average
costs of distribution will be about double those of his competitor. This
tactic is not a recipe for monopolization.
If, for some unlikely reason, it is impossible to create new distribu-
tion outlets, the analysis resembles that of predatory pricing. The exis-
ting distributors are the producers' only customers, and the only pos-
sible response by the second producer to the first producer's offer to
acquire the distributors is to match the offer. If the first producer
can somehow succeed in obtaining control of distribution, and with it
a monopoly of production, the price of control will be high. The mini-
mum price for the distributors' assets will be the costs to the second
producer of being forced out of business; the second producer will
pay any price up to that cost in order not to be forced out.
What are the implications of this analysis of vertical acquisition for
legal policy? Although it is unlikely, a monopolist might acquire its dis-
tributors, other customers, or suppliers in order to hinder new entry. It
is improbable, however, that a firm in a competitive industry would
acquire a customer or supplier because of an exclusionary motive; even
for our firm with 50 percent of the market, the acquisition of distribu-
tors was an implausible method of excluding competition.
Now consider the case in which all or most of the firms in a com-
petitive industry are acquiring distributors, or other customers, and,
if the trend is not checked, the industry will eventually be completely
integrated. New entry might be hindered, but there are two strong
[41:506
Exclusionary Practices
objections to a rule forbidding such vertical acquisitions. First, delay-
ing new entry will have no effect if, as assumed, the industry is com-
petitive; prices will be at the competitive level whether or not entry is
imminent. To be sure, delaying entry may increase the gains from
cartelization, making it more likely that the industry will be cartelized,
but this prospect seems too remote to support a prohibition.48 Second,
the simultaneous movement of a number of independent producers to
acquire customers or suppliers is more likely to reflect the existence
of economies of integration than a purpose of hindering entry, unless
the firms are already colluding. At least in an industry having more
than a few firms, it is unlikely that each firm would act based on the
belief that if it acquired its distributors and each of its competitors
happened to do the same (so that no independent distributors re-
mained), there would be greater opportunity for profitable collusion,
because the threat of new entry would be lessened. Since there are
motives for mergers unrelated to the desire to monopolize or the econ-
omies of integration, one cannot be certain that a series of vertical
mergers proves the existence of substantial economies of vertical in-
tegration in an industry. It is more likely, however, to reflect economies
than collusion.
The conclusion is that a rule against vertical mergers is untenable,
except possibly when one of the parties to the merger already has a
monopoly. Moreover, it is not at all clear how to design an appropriate
rule even for that limited case. It would be absurd to forbid a monopo-
list to be vertically integrated; literally construed, this rule would mean
that the monopolist was required to contract out all stages of the pro-
duction process. The rule would have to be limited to "unnecessary"
integration-integration not justified by efficiency, but adopted in
order to hinder entry. Such a rule would be even harder to apply con-
cretely than the parallel rule suggested in the predatory-pricing area.
C. Exclusive Dealing
In our original vertical merger example, the monopoly producer, in-
stead of buying the distributors and forbidding them to sell to any
newcomer, could have entered into contracts with the distributors
whereby the latter would agree not to handle the goods of a competing
producer. Whether such a contract has any exclusionary effect depends
on its duration. If the contract is terminable on short notice, as in the
48 The effect of vertical integration in shoring up a cartel by reducing the opportunity
for cheating, explained in Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CM L. REv.
500, 516 & n.48 (1969), would also appear to be too small to justify prohibiting vertical
integration.
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Standard Stations case,49 the exclusionary effect will normally be zero,
since the distributor is free to take on a new supplier at any time. The
only exception to this general rule occurs when there are such econ-
omies of scale in distribution, or efficiencies in distributing a variety of
products at the same outlet, that a distributor forced to choose between
handling only the goods of the existing seller and only the goods of a
small new firm-the choice forced upon him by the exclusive-dealing
contract-will always choose the former.50 The effect is merely to in-
crease the scale necessary for new entry, but by our earlier analysis this
effect will also increase the time required for entry.
The exception is inapplicable to Standard Stations, the leading prec-
edent on exclusive dealing. The distributors in that case were retail
gasoline dealers. A new entrant into the production of gasoline would
have had no trouble obtaining retail outlets, because service stations
find it uneconomical to handle more than one brand of gasoline.5'
Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the exclusive-dealing contracts be-
tween a supplier and the retail dealers.
Even if we assume an exclusive-dealing contract of indefinite or very
long duration, the use of exclusive dealing as a method of exclusion
seems even less likely than the use of vertical mergers for this purpose.52
The distributor who sells his business is indifferent to the amount of
competition that remains in the market; he is out of it. But the dis-
tributor who agrees to carry the goods of only one producer as part of a
scheme to give that producer a monopoly will be uneasy. Once the
producer achieves a monopoly, the distributor will be at his mercy, un-
less the contractual terms prevent the producer from later charging him
a monopoly price or compensate him for the future exactions. If the
distributor insists on such terms, however, the producer will never ob-
tain any monopoly profits from driving out his competitor.
This shortcoming of exclusive dealing as a method of monopoliza-
tion is illustrated by the second United Shoe Machinery case.53 United,
which had a virtual monopoly of the production of shoe machinery,
refused to sell its machines to customers (shoe manufacturers); it would
49 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
50 Standard Fashions Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922), may have been
such a case. See Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv.
281, 293 (1956).
51 Despite the Court's invalidation of exclusive-dealing contracts in the gasoline in-
dustry, multibrand stations remain rare.
52 It may, however, lessen the problem of diseconomies of vertical integration.
53 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1953).
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only lease them, and it insisted on ten-year leases. The district court
found that this policy impaired the prospects of competing producers
by preventing them, during the terms of the leases, from entering the
large market consisting of United's customers. There are several ob-
jections to this conclusion. One objection is that competing shoe-ma-
chinery firms would not be foreclosed, since they could always buy a
shoe manufacturer; but this action could involve delay and possible
diseconomies of integration not borne by United. A more forceful ob-
jection is that the competing producer could line up United customers
in advance of the expiration date of their leases; every year about 10
percent of the market would be free to contract. Further, because the
useful life of shoe machinery is longer than ten years, the customer
would rarely be in the market for a new machine less than ten years
after having purchased one; thus, a ten-year lease may not be substan-
tially more restrictive than an unconditional sale.
The point I want to emphasize, however, is a different one. The cus-
tomers of United would not participate in a campaign to strengthen
United's monopoly position without insisting on being compensated
for the loss of alternative, and less costly (because competitive), sources
of supply. Firms often shift their purchases among competing suppliers
in order to preserve competition in their supply markets.
This objection, however, entails a free-rider problem, best under-
stood through an arithmetical example. Suppose a competing shoe-ma-
chinery manufacturer leases a machine under a lease terminable at will,
for $10,000 a year; United offers to lease a similar machine for $9,000
a year, but insists on a ten-year lease designed to destroy competing prod-
ucers and enable United at the end of the term to raise its price to
$20,000. The $9,000 price is no bargain since the deal offered by United
would impose an additional cost on the purchaser equal to the present
value of the higher price in the future. If that present value is $2,000 a
year, United's offer is tantamount to charging the lessee $11,000. Never-
theless, he might accept United's offer, figuring either that (1) other shoe
manufacturers would lease from the second producer at $10,000, keep-
ing that producer in business and thus protecting the lessee from a
United monopoly, or (2) other lessees would lease from United at
$9,000, leaving him with higher costs if he paid $10,000 to the second
producer and no advantage in the future if the second producer could
not survive on his .patronage alone. Although the lessee might figure
either way, there is no reason to expect that he would. If people always
thought in such ways, no cartel, other than one that was legally enforce-
able, would be even partially effective. Each member would undersell
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the cartel price, figuring that everyone else was doing so or that every-
one else was selling at the cartel price; under either assumption, cheat-
mng pays.
Moreover, the second producer can overcome the free-rider problem
by offering to lease equipment at $10,000 on the condition that a
specified minimum number of shoe manufacturers lease equipment
from him. Each lessee would find it advantageous to enter into such a
contract, rather than pay $9,000 and accept an exclusivity condition
from United, since the annual cost of the United lease is actually
$11,000.
The record of the United Shoe Machinery case indicates that United
in fact offered extensive financial concessions to induce shoe manufac-
turers to lease equipment from United. The above analysis suggests
that if United's purpose was exclusion, these concessions may have dis-
sipated all or most of the potential monopoly profits to be gained by ex-
cluding competition. There is an alternative, nonexclusionary motive
for the lease-only policy, mentioned above,r4 and it seems a more plau-
sible explanation than exclusion.r5
To summarize, it is unlikely that a rational profit-maximizing firm
will use exclusive dealing as a method of excluding a competitor, but
one cannot be sure that it will never do so. Again, to formulate the
correct legal rule it is necessary to relax the assumption that firms in-
variably adopt profit-maximizing policies. United might have decided,
deliberately or through ignorance, to exclude competition at the price
of foregoing all or most of its monopoly profits. If so, the implications
for policy are unclear. It would be odd to punish-rather than reward
-the monopolist who charged the competitive price in order to retain
his monopoly. Surely punishment cannot be justified on the theory
that the competitors of a monopolist have a right to insist that he facili-
tate entry by maintaining high prices--the curious, probably inadver-
tent, theory of the Telex decision. 56
To be sure, an exclusionary practice that may result in the elimination
or reduction of monopoly profits may also have inefficient economic
consequences. Such consequences result from predatory pricing. A pe-
riod of below-cost pricing, which has effects parallel to and as inefficient
as monopoly pricing, is succeeded by a period of monopoly prices higher
than if the monopolist had followed the dominant-firm approach,
54 See text at note 22 supra.
55 That the court's injunction against the lease-only policy did not lead to a significant
erosion of United's monopoly is some evidence that there was no exclusionary effect. See
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
56 See text at note 32 supra.
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where price is set at a level that both generates monopoly profits and
attracts new entrants. 57 There is no similar inefficiency, however, in the
lease-only case. If United was charging the competitive lease rate be-
cause it was willing to trade monopoly profits for perpetuation of its
monopoly, the efficiency of resource use was enhanced. 58
Another exclusionary practice alleged in the United Shoe Machinery
case was the charging of a single price for machinery and its repair. The
court found that this "bundling" had retarded the emergence of an
independent shoe-machinery repair industry, thereby making it more
difficult for other manufacturers of shoe machinery to compete with
United. United was charging its customers for repair service whether
or not they utilized it, so the customer was discouraged from looking
elsewhere for repair service for his United machines. According to the
court, the bundling made it difficult for other manufacturers of shoe
machinery to compete with United. If there were economies of scale in
repair, forcing other shoe-machinery producers to arrange for repair
services might increase their costs relative to those of United. Without
such economies the only possible effect of the bundling would be to
delay the entry of new firms into shoe-machinery production. The like-
lihood of these effects is not illuminated by the court's opinion.
The court also failed to deal adequately with the allegation that
United practiced price discrimination as an exclusionary tactic. The
ratio of price to marginal cost was found to be lower in leases of those
types of United machinery for which competing producers offered close
substitutes than in United's other leases. This relationship is not at all
surprising. Competition would increase the elasticity of demand for
United's machinery, reducing the profit-maximizing price. It is true
that the market would become less attractive to other producers as the
price of United's machinery decreased, but it is distinctly odd to charac-
terize this consequence of price discrimination as exclusionary in a
pejorative sense. There was no allegation of below-cost pricing, merely
of variance across markets in the proportion of monopoly profit in
United's prices. If United were forbidden to discriminate, this propor-
tion would rise in those markets in which it faced competition. As in
Telex, the court was telling a monopolist to hold the umbrella of
monopoly prices over its competitors. As suggested above,59 it might be
57 See text following note 2 supra; Stigler, supra note 2.
58 This conclusion assumes that the only social costs of monopoly arise from monopoly
pricing. If monopoly led to other sorts of social cost, such as suboptimum innovation or
failure to minimize input costs, then the argument in the text would have to be modified.
There is, however, no persuasive theoretical or empirical evidence that monopoly has
these other effects.
59 See text and notes at notes 5-22 supra.
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possible to justify prohibiting price discrimination because of its effect
on the amount of resources expended in monopolizing. It is indefensi-
ble, however, to try to justify such a prohibition on the ground that it
makes entry less attractive. The effect of the discriminating firm's
charging lower prices in markets in which demand is more elastic is to
-increase output, which is a good effect of discrimination.6"
If we place the old U.S. Steel 1 case alongside United Shoe Machinery
and Alcoa,62 the other leading monopolization decision of the modem
period, we discover that the antitrust laws treat the firm that charges
low, but not inefficiently low, prices in order to retain a monopoly
position more harshly than the firm that seeks to maximize its monop-
oly profits by charging a high price. Judge Hand criticized Alcoa for
expanding its productive capacity in anticipation of increases in the
demand for aluminum. U.S. Steel had followed the opposite strategy
of limiting output in order to maintain price above the competitive
level. It would seem that a monopolist should be encouraged to ex-
pand rather than to restrict its output; to reduce prices to meet com-
petition, unless the price reduction is below long-run marginal cost
and made with intent to exclude; and to trade high prices and monop-
oly profits for continued possession of a large market share.
D. Boycotts
The antitrust boycott cases involve a heterogeneous body of prac-
tices, many of which are not exclusionary, at least in any sense relevant
to an economically rational antitrust policy. The Kiefer-Stewart case 63
involved a nonexclusionary boycott. Two producers had stopped selling
to a wholesaler who refused to comply with their resale price ceilings.
The only victim of the producers' refusal to deal was a customer; there
was no exclusion of actual or potential competitors. The Court found
an illegal'boycott, implying that every price-fixing case is also a boycott
case, since naturally the members of a cartel will refuse to sell to a cus-
tomer who is unwilling to pay the cartel price.
A second irrelevant body of boycott cases is illustrated by Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 4 in which the Supreme Court held that it
was a violation of the Sherman Act for the stock exchange to exclude a
60 The level of economic analysis in the United Shoe Machinery opinion is low. But
the fault does not lie with the district court; it lies with the court's economist law clerk.
See C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF AN ANTi-TRusT CASE 64-72 (1956).
61 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); see text at note 2
supra.
62 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
63 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., S40 U.S. 211 (1951).
64 873 U.S. 341 (1963).
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broker from access to its facilities without giving him a hearing. The
Court seemed to consider the reason for exclusion irrelevant; it did not
require proof that the broker was excluded in order to limit competi-
tion (perhaps because he was a price cutter) or that his exclusion was
likely to have any anticompetitive effects. It is interesting to note
that the stock exchange is a cartel;6 5 Silver and other cases66 can be read
as supporting the curious proposition that members of a cartel have a
legal duty-imposed by antitrust law-to deal fairly with each other.
The boycotts that are an appropriate subject of attention under the
antitrust laws are of two types, illustrated by the Eastern States61 and
Fashion Originators'68 cases. Eastern States involved a blacklist by re-
tail lumber dealers of any wholesalers who sold directly to a retail pur-
chaser, that is, to a customer of one of the dealers. The success of the
blacklist did not depend on enlisting the customers' cooperation, and
this fact distinguishes the case from exclusive dealing. Success de-
pended on two things: first, that the retail dealers possessed monopsony
power vis-A-vis any single wholesaler (otherwise the threat of cutting
him off would not induce him to forego profitable sales to retail cus-
tomers); second, that the wholesalers were not sufficiently well organized
to make a credible threat to cut off a boycotting retailer from alterna-
tive sources of supply.
By refusing to deal, the retailers lost the profits they could have ob-
tained from charging the wholesalers for the privilege of selling di-
rectly to consumers. Stated otherwise, the monopsony price might have
been lower without the blacklist, since the blacklist imposed an
extra cost on the wholesalers in the form of lost profits of direct selling.
The refusal to deal may, however, have made better sense than depress-
ing the purchase price if either one of two conditions existed: (1) the
wholesalers' direct sales to consumers hurt the retailers more than they
helped the wholesalers;6 9 (2) the retail dealers found it easier (cheaper)
to agree to cut off direct-selling wholesalers than to agree on the opti-
mum monopsony price.
In Fashion Originators', a guild of dress manufacturers threatened to
stop selling to any retailer who carried the dresses of competing manu-
facturers, which the guild called "style pirates." In effect, the guild was
trying to force the retailer to buy exclusively from its members. Our
65 See Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN.
L. R v. 675 (1970).
66 E.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); see note 21 supra.
67 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 600 (1914).
68 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
69 This effect might exist because the wholesalers were less efficient at direct selling than
the retailers and were able to do so profitably only because the retailers were charging
monopoly prices.
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earlier discussion indicates that the guild may have had to pay a high
price to prevent the "style pirates" from opening retail outlets. But if
efficient distribution requires that a variety of clothing styles be made
available in each retail store, which is probably true, the costs of open-
ing retail outlets may have been prohibitive for the "style pirates." As
further support for the conjecture that this case was that rare instance
in which exclusive dealing is an effective exclusionary tactic, no party
suggested any nonexclusionary purpose for the boycott. The court did
consider whether the exclusion was justified because the style pirates
were guilty of a tort, but this contention was rejected on the facts. The
Court also said, however, that the attempted justification was irrelevant.
The justification is actually decisive, since it is not a proper purpose of
the antitrust laws to protect unfair competition. 0
The conclusion is that where a boycott is designed to exclude com-
petition, it should be prima facie unlawful. Eastern States and Fashion
Originators' were correctly decided, because the only purpose of the
challenged practices was to exclude competition and no justification
compatible with the aims of antitrust policy was established.
IV. THE EXCLUSIONARY PRAricEs AS TORTS
To try to exclude a competitor is not always irrational; even if it
were, one might still want to punish the attempt. The most difficult
question raised by the exclusionary practices is not whether such prac-
tices exist, which is the focus of the debate between the Chicago School
and its opponents, but whether they are sufficiently dangerous to jus-
tify extremely costly enforcement efforts, costly because of the difficulty
of distinguishing between exclusionary practices and practices that pro-
mote efficiency.
I am far from being confident that the practices are sufficiently dan-
gerous to justify attempting to prohibit them, but even if they are, they
are not necessarily a fit subject for public enforcement. The case for
public enforcement is strongest either where the victims of a socially
undesirable practice have no incentive to bring a private action, per-
haps because the cost of the violation to any victim is small, or where
effective deterrence can only be accomplished by imprisonment or some
other form of punishment not involving a transfer payment to the vic-
70 Donald Turner has pointed out that allowing the use of boycotts to enforce tort
law or other sources of legal rights might be objectionable as interfering with a more or
less carefully calibrated or proportioned system of legal remedies. This observation may be
accurate but it is not an objection founded on the policy of the antitrust laws, which is to
prevent monopoly.
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tim.71 The second reason is actually part of the first: without the transfer
payment the victim would have no incentive to sue. These factors do
not apply to the exclusionary practices. The costs to the victim, invari-
ably a business firm and not an individual, of being excluded from a
market by an exclusionary practice are substantial, and the wrongdoer
can almost always be deterred by an appropriately heavy monetary
penalty.
Private enforcement of federal antitrust law against the exclusionary
practices suffers, however, from the serious drawback, discussed above,
that Congress and the Supreme Court appear to be unable to formulate
reasonable antitrust rules at tolerable cost. Perhaps a public monopoly
of enforcement in this area is the best idea after all. An alternative
would be to remit the victims of exclusionary practices to their rem-
edies under state tort law.72
Whatever the legal basis on which exclusionary practices are chal-
lenged, it seems clear that actual damages should be the measure of a
successful plaintiff's recovery (except possibly in predatory-pricing
cases), and that punitive damages should not be allowed. The only
justification for the treble-damage remedy of federal antitrust law is
that antitrust violations are concealable, so that actual damages often
fail to place the full costs of a violation on the violator. If a potential
violator evaluated the costs of a concealable violation, he would dis-
count the applicable penalty by the less-than-certain probability of
getting caught. In such a case, actual damages are an inadequate deter-
rent. The exclusionary practices, however, are generally not con-
cealable-a partial exception is predatory pricing7 -and the award of
treble damages thus creates an excessive inducement to sue.
71 A more systematic and comprehensive analysis of the choice between public and
private enforcement, but one that does not affect the present discussion, may be found
in W. Landes & R. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, May 1974 (unpublished
paper).
72 State legislatures and courts do not appear to be overburdened to the same degree as
their federal counterparts; conceivably the state courts would develop a body of tort
doctrine applicable to the exclusionary practices that was in accord with proper economic
considerations. Cf. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUOxs 29 (1972). This
suggestion is highly speculative. Its feasibility depends on such questions as whether state
laws would develop with sufficient uniformity and whether state courts would be able
to handle the additional work load.
73 Predatory pricing is a possible exception because of the injured competitor's lack of
information about the alleged predator's costs, which makes it difficult to distinguish
between predatory and efficient pricing. However, if a firm observes that a competitor is
selling below its costs, the firm is on notice that the competitor may be selling below his
own costs. Whether he actually is can be ascertained through discovery proceedings.
Double damages might make better sense than treble damages, in recognition of the fact
that predatory pricing is less concealable than price fixing.
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